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I

NATURE OF THE CASE
The portion of the lawsuit on appeal concerns CrossClaims between Crossclaimant-Appellant Reid Swapp ("Swapp")
Crossclaimant-Respondent

Tanglewood

SLC

Associates,

an~,

Ltd.

("Tanglewood"), arising out of construction work performed by
Swapp on property owned by Tanglewood.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
As a result of the failure of Swapp to respond to
discovery requests made by Tanglewood and to comply with an
Order compel ling Swapp to respond to such discovery requests,
on July 1, 1981, Judge James S. Sawaya entered an Order striking the Cross-Claim of Swapp against Tanglewood, and striking
the Answer of Swapp to the Cross-Claim of Tanglewood.

Further,

on July 1, 1981, after strking the pleadings of Swapp, Judge
Sawaya entered Judgment in favor of Tanglewood and Joseph M.
Friedheim

("Friedheim")

against

Swapp,

as

requested

in

the

moved

the

Cross-Claim of Tanglewood and Friedheim.
Thereafter,

on

October

9,

1981,

Swapp

Court to set aside the Judgment, and a hearing on the Motion
was held on October 19, 1981, before Judge G. Hal Taylor.

On

October 26, 1981, Judge Taylor entered an Order denying the
Motion.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Tanglewood seeks affirmance of the Order of Judge
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Taylor denying the Motion of Swapp to set aside the Judgment
entered against Swapp.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On

June

10,

1980,

plaintiff

Gardiner

& Gardiner

Builders, a Utah corporation, filed a Complaint against defendants Swapp, Tanglewood, Friedheim and others seeking to recover sums for work performed on property owned by Tanglewood
and to foreclose a lien for said sum.

(Record ("R."), p. 2) •

Answers to the Complaint were duly filed by the defendants.
Swapp filed a Cross-Claim against Tanglewood (R., p. 46) and
Tanglewood

and Friedheim filed

(R. , p. 141) •

a

Cross-Claim against

Swapp.

In the Cross-Claim of Swapp, he sought to re-

cover sums for work he performed and to foreclose a lien for
said sum.

In the Cross-Claim of Tanglewood and Friedheim, they

sought to have the lien of Swapp declared void and to recover
from Swapp sums paid to Swapp for work which was not performed
or performed inadequately.

Answers to the Cross-Claims were

filed by the respective parties.

(R., p. 97 and 175).

On or about May 8, 1981, Tanglewood served on Swapp
Interrogatories (R., p. 207) and Request for Production of Documents

(R., p.

204).

On May 29,

1981,

Tanglewood served on

Swapp a Notice of Deposition scheduling the deposition of Swapp
for June 12, 1981.

(R., p. 230).

On June 11, 1981, Swapp and

Tanglewood, through their respective attorneys, entered into a
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Stipulation and Motion to Extend Discovery Period (R., p. 247),
which provided that Swapp would respond to said Interrogatories
and Request_. for Production of Documents by June 17, 1981, and
the deposition of Swapp was continued to June 30,
Order

was

entered

on

said

Stipulation

and

1981.

Motion

by

An

Judge

Sawaya on June 11, 1981.
On June 19, 1981, Tanglewood filed a Motion to Compel Swapp to respond

to

Production of Documents,

the

for

as required by the Order entered by

Judge Sawaya on June 11,
June 25,

Interrogatories and Request

1981.

A hearing was

1981 on said Motion to Compel.

(R.,

scheduled for
p.

254).

The

Motion to Compel was granted and an Order was entered (R., p.
267), which provided additional time for Swapp to respond to
the discovery requests.

The Order further provided that

the

pleadings of Swapp would be stricken if Swapp failed to comply
with the Order.
Swapp failed to comply with the Order, and on June
30, 1981, Tanglewood and Friedheim filed a Motion to Strike the
pleadings

of Swapp.

(R.,

p.

276).

On June 1,

1981,

Judge

Sawaya entered an Order striking the pleadings of Swapp (R., p.
272),

and

tered.

a

Default

Certificate

and

Judgment

were

then

en-

(R., p. 271 and 279).
On July 9, a Motion for Supplemental Order was made

(R., p.

283), and on July 10, 1981, a Supplemental Order was
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issued.

such Order was

served.

was issued _Augu·st 12,
Return,
home

There is no indication in the Record if

(R., p. 288).

However,
1981.

a

second Supplemental Order

(R., p.

290).

According to the

the Motion and Supplemental Order were

of Swapp

on

September

3,

1981.

(R.,

served at

p.

292).

the

Swapp

failed to appear at the hearing on the Supplemental Order (R.,
p. 293), and an Order to Show Cause was issued and served personally on Swapp on September 22,

1981.

(R.,

p.

296).

hearing on the Order to Show Cause was held October 2,
and Swapp personally appeared.
On

October

9,

The
1981,

(R., p. 297).

1981,

the

Motion

to

Set

Aside

the

Judgment and supporting documents were prepared, and were filed
with the Court on October 13,
hearing on the Motion was
1981.

(R., p.

310).

1981.

(R. ,

p.

298-311) •

The

scheduled and held on October 19,

After argument, Judge Taylor entered an

Order denying the Motion to Set Asi.de the Judgment.

(R.,

p.

313).
In the Brief of Swapp, it is stated that Swapp first
became aware of the Judgment on October 1, 1981, when an Execution was served.

(Swapp Brief, p.

5).

As noted above, Swapp

was served with a Supplemental Motion and Order on September 3,
1981,

and

the Supplemental Motion specifically states

Judgment was entered against Swapp.

(R., p. 283).

that a

Further, an

Order to Show Cause was issued and served on Swapp on September
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22, 1981.

(R., p. 294-296).

It is also noted that the Execu-

tion (R., p. 321), according to the Return, was served on Swapp
on September 22-, 1981.

(See the back side of page 322 of the

Record).
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD DEFER 'TO THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION DENYING SWAPP'S MOTION TO
SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT.
The Utah Supreme

Court

has held

repeatedly

that

a

trial court's decision on a motion to set aside a default judgment should be afforded great deference,

and should only be

reversed when an abuse of discretion is clearly shown.
The trial court is endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in granting or
denying a motion to relieve a party from a
final
judgment
under
Rule
60{b){l),
U.R.C.P., and this court will reverse the
trial court only where an abuse of this
discretion is clearly established. • • •
[T]his court will not reverse the determination of the trial court merely because
the motion could have been granted.
Airkem Intermountain Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P. 2d
429, 431 (1973).

Accord, Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (Utah

1979); Central Finance Co. v. Kynaston, 22 Utah 2d 284,

452

P.2d 316 (1969); and Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah
2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962).
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POINT II:
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED SWAPP' S
MOTION BECAUSE, UNDER UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 60(b) IT WAS NOT TIMELY.
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
Upon motion and upon such terms as are just the
court may in the furtherance of justice, relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final
Judgment, Order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; • • • or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), (3)J or (4),
not more than three months after the ud ment,
Order, or proceed ng was entere •
Emp as1s
added).
Swapp moved to set aside

the default

judgment more

than three months after judgment was entered against him, although he knew of the Judgment within said three month period.
Nonetheless, he now argues that his Motion was not time barred
under Rule 60(b).

The substance of his argument is that his

motion falls into the category of Rule 60(b) (7),

rather than

60{b)(l), and that the three month limit does not apply under
Rule 60(b) (7).

In other words, to avoid the time limitations

of 60(b) (1), Swapp argues that the grounds for setting aside
the default against him do not involve "mistake, inadvertence,
surprise,

or excusable neglect"

(60(b) (1)),

but

rather

"any

other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment"

(60(b) (7)).

This B.rgument

is without foundation based
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upon the facts of this case.
The only justifications Swapp assets for relieving him
from the

d~_fault

judgment is that he should be excused for his

original attorney's neglect.

As set out in Point III below,

the neglect of an attorney is imputed to the client, and accordingly, the arguments of Swapp fall squarely in 60(b) (1).
However, Swapp seeks to obscure this rule of law by stressing
the magnitude of his original attorney's alleged negligence.
Regardless of the degree of negligence, however, the argument
is still covered by 60(b)(l) and the time limitations applicable thereto.

Swapp is merely trying to use 60(b)(7) to circum-

vent the three month time limit that applies to motions under
60(b)(l).
The Utah Supreme Court has rejected a similar attempt
to circumvent Rule 60(b)(l) in Pitts v. Mclachlan, 567 P.2d 171
(Utah 1977).

Other cases have similarly held that the residual

provisions of 60(b) (7) cannot be used to circumvent the time
limitations under Rule 60(b)(l), and the provisions of subparts
(1) and (7) are mutually exclusive.
gence

Agency,

Serzysko v.

607

F.2d

339,

Goland v. Central Intelli-

372-73

Chase Manhattan Bank,

(D.C.

Cir.,

1978),

and

461 F.2d 699,

701-02

(2d

Cir., 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1029.

Also see, Wright &

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil, § 2864, p~ 217.
Since 60(b)(7) is a catch-all provision it could encompass any
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argument that would be more aptly categorized under 60{b) (1),
(2), (3) or (4).
to

the

If Swapp's negligence argument can be subject

indefinite

60(b) (7),

time

limit

applicable

to

motions

under

then so can a.ny other claim that would be more at

home in a different category.

This result would destroy the

purpose and certainty of a definite three month time limit.
Even if Swapp

is

correct

that Rule

60(b) (7)

is

the

proper basis for its motion to set aside the default judgment,
Rule 60(b), whether under subpart

(1)

or

(7),

still requires

that the motion he brought "within a reasonable time."
failed to do even this.

In the Brief of Swapp, it is stated at

page 5 that he

first

1981.

at page 15 of the Brief,

However,

Swapp

learned of the

Judgment

learned of the Judgment on September 20,

on October 1,

it is

stated Swapp

1981.

According

to

the Record, Swapp should have learned of the Judgment on September 3, 1981, when Swapp was served with a Supplemental Order.

In any event, the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment was

not prepared until October 9, 1981.

The delay in bringing the

Motion hardly shows prompt attention to the matter on the part
of Swapp.

Under the circumstances of this case, Judge Taylor

found that Swapp did not bring the Motion within a reasonable
time, and this Court should uphold the finding of Judge Taylor,
whether the Motion was under Rule 60(b)(l) or 60(b)(7).
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POINT III:
EVEN HAD IT BEEN TIMELY, SWAPP'S MOTION TO
SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT WOULD HAVE BEEN
WITHOUT MERIT BECAUSE SWAPP MUST BE HELD
RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS ATTORNEY'S NEGLECT AND
BECAUSE SWAPP WAS GUILTY OF NEGLECT HIMSELF.
Swapp makes no claim in this case that his attorney
was not guilty of neglect or that his attorney's neglect was
Swapp cannot therefore prevail on a

excusable.

motion under

Rule 60(b) if this Court ascribes his attorney's conduct to him.
In general, a client is held responsible for his attorney's negligence and cannot use such negligence as an excuse
to

escape

a

default

judgment.

The

Supreme

Court

of Nevada

stated this rule recently in Tahoe Village Realty v.
590 P.2d 1158 (Nev. 1979).

There,

defendants'

Desmet,

attorney with-

drew from the case without ever filing an answer and without
informing defendants of his withdrawal.
after

defendants'

attorney

withdrew,

entered in favor of plaintiffs.

Approximately a month
a

default

judgment

was

Defendants appealed the trial

court's denial of their motion to set aside the default judgment.

The Nevada Supreme Court stated:
Appellants only remaining argument is that
their attorneys nonfeasance should not be
imputed to them.
We have previously considered and resolved this issue:
'It is a
general rule that the negligence of an attorney is imputable to his client and that
the latter cannot be relieved from a judgment taken against him in consequence of the
neglect,
carelessness,
forgetfulness,
or
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attention
of
the
former.'
Guardia
v.
Guardia, 48 Nev. 230, 233-234, 229 P. 386,
387 (1924). Tahoe Village Realty v. Desmet,
590 P.2d at 1161.
Similarly, in Southern Bonding Co. v. Teel, 550 P.2d,
571 (Okl. 1976), an attorney failed to file an answer for more
than year while assuring his client that the "matter was being
taken care of."
held that:

Id.

at 574.

"[a]n attorney's

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma
negligence while

representing

a

client is imputable to client as client's negligence and does
not constitute 'unavoidable casulty and misfortune'
vacation of judgment under statute."

Id. at 575.

justifying
The Supreme

Court sustained the trial court's rejection of the motion to
vacate the default.
The federal courts follow a similar rule in applying
the provisions of rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

"Appellant • • • claims that the judgment should have

been set aside under rule 60(b)(l) for 'mistakes, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect'

because he did not personally

consent to his attorney's failure to appear.
tention

to

Shappij v.

be

wholly

Jay Emm,

See Williams v.

frivolous."

Nederlandsche

Inc., 301 F.2d 114,

Five Platters,

We find his con-

Inc.,

115

Handel-Maat

(2nd Cir.

510 F.2d

963

1962).

(C.C.P.A.

1975).
The holdings

of the Utah

Supreme

Court

have

been

consistent with the rule that the Oklahoma and Nevada Supreme
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Courts articulated in Tahoe Village Realty and Southern Bonding
Co.
tion

The Utah case that is most closely analogous to the situathis _.appeal

Parker,

30 Utah

Airkem appealed

presents
2d

the

65,

is

513

Airkem
P.2d

Intermountain,

429

(1973).

rejection of his motion

to

Inc·

v.

Defendant

in

set

aside

a

default, pleading that his attorney failed to appear for trial
after attempting unsuccessfully to reach him and inform him of
the trial date ten days prior to trial.

He explained his at-

torney's failure to reach him by stating that he was away at
work from 7:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. and that he visited his terminally ill wife at the hospital during the evenings.
preme Court sustained the trial court's refusal

The Su-

to set aside

the default.
The Supreme Court

found

that

the

trial court was defensible on two grounds.
dant may have been negligent
with his attorney.

in

failing

decision

second

ground,

the

First, the defento maintain - contact

Second, the attorney may have been negli-

gent in his belated attempt to reach his client.
this

of

the

Supreme

Court

In endorsing

recognized

that

an

attorney's negligence is properly charged to the client in considering whether to uphold a default judgment.
Under

the

rule

of

Tahoe

Village

Realty,

Southern

Bonding Co., and Airkem, there can be no basis for overruling
the trial court and setting aside the default in this case.
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Swapp's attorney inexcusably neglected to file papers that had
to be filed to avoid default.

This was exactly the situation

in both Tahoe Village Realty and Southern Bonding Co.
Swapp argues that negligence is different from abandonment and that his attorney abandoned him.

Whenever an at-

torney neglects a case to the point of default, however, this
argument can be made with equal force.

If this court adopts

Swapp's abandonment theory, no default will be secure and delay
and default will be without an effective deterrent.
Even if Swapp is not held responsible for his attorney's

negligence,

the

default should stand.

trial

court's

decision

upholding

the

Like the defendant in Airkem, Swapp was

negligent in failing to maintain contact with his attorney to
ascertain whether his interests were being guarded.

The reci-

tation of facts in Swapp' s own brief on this appeal makes no
reference to any communciation between Swapp and his attorney
in the year and a half between the time Swapp filed his answer
and the time the default judgment was entered.

By itself, this

should be enough to support the trial court's decision.
The only Utah case Swapp cites to support his position is Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla Development Corp.,
611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), which is completely irrelevant to
this

situation.

In

Inters-tate

Excavating,

the

defendant's

attorney withdrew from the case with court approval and sent
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notice to his client.

The client failed to get a new attorney

and appear at trial.

The trial court entered a default judg-

ment

again~t

him.

Defendant

moved

to

have

the

default

set

aside on the ground that he had never received notice of his
attorney's

withdrawal.

He

speculated

that

the

notice

might

have been lost in his office in a large packet of mail from the
same attorney.
the default.

The trial court denied the motion to set aside
The Supreme Court

reversed holding

that defen-

dant's failure to appear was the result of excusable negligect
in misplacing the notice of his attorney's withdrawal.
There was no question in Interstate Excavating about
the propriety of the behavior of defendant's original attorney.

The court merely held that defenant was not inexcusably

negligent
drawal.

in

misplacing

the

notice

of

his

attorney's

with-

It did not hold that a client can escape the conse-

quences of inexcusable neglect by blaming his attorney.
There is also an obvious practical distinction between

Interstate

Excavating

and

this

case.

If

the

Supreme

Court had let the default stand in Interstate Excavating, the
defendant would have been liable for the amount of the judgment
without any hope of indemnification for that amount.
the

original

attorney

in

Interstate

Excavating,

Unlike
however,

Swapp' s original attorney was negligent in handling his case.
Thus Swapp has a cause of action for malpractice against his
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original attorney which may

shift

the burden of

the

default

judgment.
·The cases from other jurisdictions that Swapp cites
to support of his position in this appeal do not
purpose any better than Interstate Excavating.
Dickson, 46 Haw.
on,

the

attorney

somehow failed
fault.

52,
in

374 P.2d 665
that

case

In Stafford v.

(1962), which Swapp relies

properly withdrew and

to reach his client.

The holding

serve that

in Stafford

is

This resulted
almost

notice

in a

identical

to

dethe

holding in Interstate Excavating and is just as irrelevant to
this case.

643

(Okl.

placed.

Swapp also relies on Rogers v.

Sheppard,

1948).

not

In

the

Swapp's
Rogers

reliance

case,

an

could

attorney

be

192 P.2d
more

suffered

a

misheart

attack, and he was unable to attend to his business which resulted in a default.

The Oklahoma statute permitted vacation

of default judgments that resulted from "unavoidable casulty or
misfortune."

Id. at 645.

The court held:

The failure of counsel to prosecute or defend a cause through no fault of the attorney or client, resulting in a default judgment being rendered against
the client
constitutes • • • unavoidable casulty or
misfortune.
In 49 C.J.S. Judgments, §280,
the rule applicable here is stated as follows:
"The illness of party's counsel so
severe as to prevent him from appearing in
trying the case :f.s good ground for vacating
the judgment, provided such party did not
know that in time to retain other counsel or
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was prevented in some other way fron doing
so. Id. at 645-46.
(Emphasis added).
This holding has

nothing to do with Swapp who

is

trying

to
,'

escape the ·consequences of his attorney's inexcusable neglect·
Swapp leans heavily on Buckert v. Briggs, 15 Cal. App.
3rd 296, 93 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971).

Buckert stands for the prop-

osition that where an attorney goes beyond negligence and acts
in such a way as to negate the attorney-client

relationship,

the general rule that the client is chargable with his attorney's negligence should not apply.
As a general rule the accident or mistake
authorizing relief [from a default judgment]
may not be predicated upon the neglect of
the party's attorney unless shown to be excusable • • • because the negligence of the
attorney • • • is imputed to his client and
may not be offered by the latter as a basis
for relief. • • • The exception is premised
upon the concept the attorney's conduct, in
effect, obliterates the existence of the attorney-client relationship and for this reason his negligence should not be imputed to
the client. Id. at 63-64.
The court in Buckert stressed that the attorney acted and spoke
as

though

there were

no attorney-client

him and the defaulting parties.

relationship

between

Id. at 64.

The Buckert rule is irrelevant to this case.

Although

Swapp's original attorney failed to protect his client's interests, he never indicated that he did not represent Swapp.
fact,

he filed answers to the Complaint and Cross-Claim,

entered

stipulations

concerning

the

timing

of

responses
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In
and
to

discovery requests.
he

may

have

done

He acted as Swapp' s attorney even though
so

inadequately.

Buckert

adds

nothing

to

Swapp's arg~ment on this appeal.
In St. Vrain Development Co. v. F

& S Development Co.,

470 P. 49 (Colo. App. 1970), which Swapp also cites, the Court
held that the trial court acted within its discretion in vacating a

default which resulted

faulting party's attorney.

from the negligence of the de-

Such a holding merely illustrates

the wide scope appellate courts typically give a trial court's
decision on a motion to set aside a default.

St. Vrain may be

authority for the proposition that the trial court could have
granted Swapp' s motion, but "this court will not reverse the
determination
could

have

of

the

been

trial

court

granted."

mainly

Airkem

because

the

Intermountain,

motion

Inc.

v.

Parker, 513 P.2d at 431.

\,

Finally, Swapp relies on Treadway v. Meador, 103 Ariz.
83, 436 P.2d 902

(1968), and Coerber v. Rath,

435 P.2d 228 {1968).
against

Mr.

assured

them

When

the

entered.

and

Treadway.

he

would

Interrogatories
The

court

held

They

answer

were

retained

certain

counse 1,

not

answered,

a

the

Treadways

should

that

Coerber

v.

Rath,

the

Coerbers

who

Interrogatories.
default

subject to default for relying on such assurances.
in

294,

In the former case a default was entered

Mrs.

that

164 Colo.

requested

and

was

not

Similarly,
received
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be

assurances from their attorney that he was properly taking care
of their case.

Swapp by contrast makes no allegation whatso-

ever that he ever sought to determine the status of this case.
Unlike appellants in Treadway and Coeber, Swapp was guilty of
negligence on his own account in failing to maintain contact
with his attorney.
CONCLUSION
There is nothing that sets this case apart from most
other cases resulting in default.

Swapp failed to respond to a

discovery request even after a motion to compel, and the trial
court entered a default and refused to set it aside.
sion is entitled to deference on appeal.

Its deci-

This court cannot

overturn that decision without destroying the finality of all
default judgments.

Any defaulting party that can convincingly

blame the default on its attorney has the same claim for relief
that Swapp puts forward.

Swapp should seek relief from the

affect of the default judgment by suing his former attorney.
This Court should affirm the Order of the Third Judicial District Court upholding the default and award costs on
this appeal against Crossclaimant-appellant Reid Swapp.
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